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ALCOHOL, DRUGS, 
AND TRAFFIC LAW 
Society's primary strategy for 
managing the safety risks posed 
by the impaired driver is the legal 
approach based on the principle 
of deterrence. Laws prohibiting 
impaired driving and calling for 
the punishment of offenders 
exist in all states. Implied- 
consent laws that assist the 
police in gathering evidence of 
impaired-driving offenses also 
exist in every state. However, 
many aspects of current state 
legislation are inadequate and 
inhibit law enforcement, 
especially with respect to drivers 
who are impaired by drugs other 
than alcohol. Many of these 
deficiencies can be remedied by 
legislative changes. 
This paper examines the chief 
legal tools directed against the 
impaired driver, describes major 
constraints on law enforcement, 
identifies the principal 
deficiencies of existing 
impaired-driving and implied- 
consent laws, and presents 




Drivers who are impaired by alcohol or other 
drugs increase the risk of a traffic crash. Alcohol- 
impa~red drivers are more frequently involved in 
crashes than drivers who had not been drinking. 
Forty to fifty-five percent of the drivers who are 
fatally injured are legally intoxicated-that is, their 
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is equal to or in 
excess of .lo% wlv. Approximately nine to thirteen 
percent of the drivers involved in personal injury 
crashes, and five percent of the drivers involved in 
property damage crashes, also have BACs equal 
to or greater than the legal standard of . lo% w/v.  
The risk that a driver will be involved in a traffic 
crash rises sharply as BAC increases. A driver with 
a BAC of . lOO/ i  w/v is six to ten times more likely to 
have a fatal crash than a nondrinking driver. The 
fatal crash risk increases to fifteen to twenty-five 
times that of the nondrinking driver when an 
alcohol-impaired driver reaches a BAC of .15% 
w/v. 
Impairment can also be caused by drugs other 
than alcohol. In some cases this may occur as a 
result of drug abuse, that is, the prohibited use of 
controlled substances or the consumption of 
drugs in quantities that exceed therapeutic doses. 
Drug-impaired driving can also result from the licit 
use of prescription and over-the-counter medica- 
tions. Other substances, such as volatile solvents, 
can also impair driving, Often drug-impaired driv- 
ing results from the use of more than one drug. 
The combined use of alcohol and other drugs is 
- - 
In many states, existing laws 
dealing with impaired driving are 
inadequate. Loopholes exist that 
allow some impaired drivers to 
escape the penalty of the law. 
Other laws contain procedural 
requirements that unnecessarily 
preclude efficient police work. 
common. Sometimes impairment may result from 
use of multiple drugs as directed, In other cases, 
the impairment may occur when a modest amount 
of alcohol is consumed while taking medications, 
Even though the drug use may not be illegal, the 
resulting impairment by alcohol and drugs in com- 
bination is just as dangerous for road users as im- 
pairment caused by alcohol alone or by illegal 
drug use. 
The frequency with which drugs other than 
alcohol are involved in crashes is not yet known. 
Drug-impaired drivers are involved in crashes and 
are arrested for impaired driving. Approximately 
one arrest for drug-impaired driving occurs for 
every 100 arrests for alcohol-impaired driving. 
The use of our legal system is the oldest and 
most widely used approach to deal with impaired 
driving. Every state has laws that prohibit driving 
while impaired by alcohol. Every state also has 
some legislation intended to deter drug-impaired 
driving. However, in many states, existing laws 
dealing with impaired driving are inadequate. 
Loopholes exist that allow some impaired drivers 
to escape the penalty of the law. Other laws con- 
tain procedural requirements that unnecessarily 
preclude efficient police work. These laws, which 
make processing the impaired driver a time- 
consuming task, are costly for society and in- 
convenient for the individual charged. 
If the legal system is to be used effectively to 
manage the traffic crash risk created by the im- 
paired driver, sound legislation must form the 
basis for action. This paper presents a discussion 
of the law relating to alcohol, drugs, and driving to 
provide an understanding of the problems with ex- 
isting laws as well as an understanding of what 
laws are needed. A concise summary of needed 
laws is presented to serve as a guide for review of 
existing legislation. This can be used by 
legislators, highway safety specialists, and citizens 
to examine the "state of the law" in their state. 
LEGAL TOOLS FOR CONTROLLING 
IMPAIRED DRIVING 
The legal approach has been the traditional ap- 
proach to the problem of impaired driving in the 
United States. It operates on the principle of deter- 
rence: laws are passed to define and prohibit 
behavior that is considered unacceptable to 
society; those who do not comply with the law are 
subject to being caught and punished; and- 
ideally-those who contemplate breaking the law 
are thus discouraged, or deterred, from doing so 
out of a belief that the unpleasant consequences of 
violating the law would outweigh the benefits (see 
Jones and Joscelyn 1976). 
Impaired-Driving Laws: Deterrence 
The most essential legal tools for controlling 
impaired driving are impaired-driving laws. The 
simplest form of impaired-driving law prohibits 
driving "while under the influence" of alcohol or 
some other drug (1). It is generally accepted that to 
be considered "under the influence," one's ability 
to drive safely must be reduced to some unaccep- 
table level. While state court decisions use varying 
language to describe this subjective standard for 
alcohol impairment (Erwin 1979, pp. 1-28-1 -43), 
and qualitative evidence of alcohol or drug in- 
fluence (i.e., the officer's observations of the 
suspect, and the of field coordination 
tests) is not precise, impaired-driving laws are 
considered clear enough to give drivers, courts, 
and juries sufficient notice of what is prohibited 
conduct. 
Development 
Prior to 1939, all states' impaired-driving laws 
had only qualitative standards of driving while un- 
der the influence. However, as more knowledge 
was gained regarding the relationship between the 
amount of alcohol in the body and the impairment 
of driving-related skills, it became possible to es- 
tablish a quantitative standard of alcohol intoxica- 
tion. Early legislation set a presumptive standard at 
a BAC of -15% w/v. At this level a judge or jury 
could presume that a driver was under the in- 
fluence of alcohol. The BAC, plus evidence of im- 
paired driving behavior, constituted proof of the of- 
fense. More recent legislation in nearly every state 
has reduced the standard to . lo% w/v (2). In the 
1970s a growing number of states-thirteen as of 
May 1979 (National Highway Traffic Safety Ad- 
ministration 1980)-have gone one step further 
and enacted so-called "per se" statutes. 
Recognizing the extremely high probability that 
impairment of driving ability occurs at and above 
-10% W/V, these states have made it an offense to 
drive with a BAC at or above that level; in those 
states, when BAG is shown to be above , lo% wlv, 
additional evidence of driving impairment is not 
required. 
Legal Restrictions on Enforcement 
Impaired driving is usually considered a 
criminal offense (3). Law-enforcement agencies 
use procedures to gather evidence and determine 
guilt or innocence that are similar to those used, for 
example, in the case of suspected burglars or nar- 
cotics peddlers. Therefore, enforcement agencies 
are bound by the same constitutional protections 
that apply to other criminal cases. Chief among 
these protections are the individual's right to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the U S .  
Constitution; and due process of law, guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Under the Fourth Amendment, for a search or 
seizure (i.e., an arrest) to be reasonable, the officer 
conducting it must have probable cause to arrest 
or search. Probable cause cannot be defined with 
precision; however, one widely accepted definition 
states that it consists of facts and circumstances 
that indicate to a reasonably prudent person tb~at 
an offense has been committed (4). The guarantee 
of due process of law prohibits violent or brutal 
means of obtaining evidence (5), but it does not 
prohibit the chemical tests for alcohol that are 
widely used in law enforcement (6). Due process 
also requires basic fairness in official proceedings, 
such as license-suspension proceedings ar~d 
criminal trials for impaired driving (7). 
It should be noted that constitutional require- 
ments relating to search and seizure, due process, 
and other basic individual rights are the supreme 
law of the land (8), and thus take precedence over 
any impaired-driving and implied-consent laws 
that conflict with the Constitution. 
Implied-Consent Laws: 
Facilitating Chemical Testing 
Rationale 
Proof of an impaired-driving offense requires 
proving three elements: operation of a motor vehi- 
cle; use of alcohol or drugs; and impairment of 
driving ability. Especially in the case of alcohol, the 
task of proving that the driver was impaired it; 
aided by chemical test results: a court or jury may 
presume, from a BAC level at or above -10% w/v, 
that driving impairment has occured (9). When test 
results are not available (such as when a driver 
refuses to take a test), impairment can still be es.. 
tablished by other evidence, including the im., 
paired driving behavior that brought the driver to 
the attention of the officer, the driver's lack of coor- 
dination, performance of field sobriety tests, 
physical appearance, odor of alcohol on the 
breath, or the presence of liquor containers in the 
vehicle. This was how impaired driving was proved 
before chemical tests came into wide use. 
After the development of chemical testing - 
methods but prior to implied consent, police relied 
on their lawful powers to forcibly seize evidence of 
impairment from a suspect so long as they had 
Implied-consent legislation has in 
fact resulted in greater, not fewer, 
restrictions on the testing process. 
probable cause to do so, and so long as the 
method of seizing it was not violent or brutal (10). 
Thus a police officer could extract a body fluid 
specimen from a suspected impaired-driving of- 
fender, over that person's objections, without 
violating the US. Constitution. Police depart- 
ments, however, are reluctant to engage in forcible 
confrontations with noncooperative suspects; 
moreover, state legislators viewed forcible testing 
for alcohol content as poor policy (Colorado Law 
Review 1976). Therefore, beginning in New York 
in 1953, legislation was enacted to replace the 
threat of physical compulsion with a substitute 
form of compulsion-namely the threat of license 
loss-when an officer attempted to obtain a body 
fluid specimen. These laws, which by 1972 were in 
force in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, 
typically state that an individual has, by the act of 
operating a vehicle on the highway, given consent 
to the taking of specimens. Thus they were given 
the popular but somewhat misleading title of 
"implied-consent" laws (1 1). The label is mis- 
leading because implied-consent legislation has in 
fact resulted in greater, not fewer, restrictions on 
the testing process. Most notably, if a driver 
refuses to submit to a test, no attempt will be made 
to obtain a specimen; instead, the matter will be 
referred to the state driver-licensing authority, 
which would take steps to suspend the driver's 
license (12). Therefore, implied-consent legisla- 
tion has created a right to refuse a chemical test 
that does not exist as a matter of constitutional law. 
In some states it is possible that police officers 
may still have the authority to forcibly test drivers. 
Court cases dealing with this issue have reached 
differing results when the driving offense involved 
was specifically covered by the implied-consent 
law (13). When, on the other hand, an offense is 
not covered by implied consent (for example, if 
manslaughter is not covered but impaired driving 
is), police officers have no alternative but to use 
their authority to forcibly seize evidence (14). It is 
also possible that in any situation, a police officer 
could persuade a driver to voluntarily submit to a 
test-whether or not such a test would be consti- 
tutional if it were compelled or whether it would be 
authorized by the implied-consent statute. In the 
case of a "consent search," care must be taken to 
ensure that the driver's consent was in fact free 
and knowing (15). 
Legal Restrictions on Testing 
Two sources of law thus govern the 
administration of chemical tests for BAC. First, the 
U.S. and state constitutions establish minimum 
protections for those suspected of impaired driv- 
ing. Under the Constitution, an officer must have 
"probable cause," that is, reasonable grounds to 
believe that the driver is under the influence, to ar- 
rest the driver or to require the driver to take a 
chemical test. In addition, the manner of testing 
must be "reasonable," that is, conducted ac- 
cording to established medical standards and 
neither violent nor brutal. Second, state implied- 
consent legislation governs the administration of 
chemical tests in all states. Implied-consent laws 
also govern the types of tests to be given and the 
manner in which the testing is to be carried out, 
and specify penalties for refusal; thus, these provi- 
sions place a set of restrictions, in addition to those 
of the US. Constitution, on police officers who in- 
tend to obtain specimens. 
DEFICIENCIES OF EXISTING LAW 
Current legislation directed at alcohol- and 
drug-impaired driving consists of: first, an 
impaired-driving law, that defines the offense and 
prescribes punishments; and second, an implied- 
consent law, that regulates the gathering of 
evidence of impairment, and prescribes punish- 
ments for refusing to submit to a test. Both 
impaired-driving and implied-consent laws are 
subject to constitutional restrictions, such as the 
requirement that the testing officer have probable . 
cause to arrest before demanding a test, and that 
the testing be conducted in a reasonable manner. 
The ultimate goal of the legal approach to the 
impaired-driving problem is to deter drivers from 
making decisions to drive while under the in- 
fluence of alcohol and/or other drugs. Within legal 
and practical constraints, an intermediate objec- 
tive is to catch, prove guilty, and sanction as many 
impaired drivers as possible. However, existing 
laws in most states exhibit deficiencies that inhibit 
the finding and punishment of impaired drivers. 
What is more, these deficiencies are not required 
by any provision of the Constitution. The rest of this 
paper points out the chief deficiencies of current 
legislation and identifies legislative reforms that 
can overcome them. 
Problems with Existing 
Impaired-Driving Laws 
Most states' impaired-driving laws consist of a 
simple prohibition of driving while "under the in- 
fluence" of alcohol or other drugs, which is 
qualitative in nature, plus a quantitative standard 
relating BAC to alcohol impairment. A few states 
also define a second, less serious offense, typical- 
ly called "driving while impaired." Citations to state 
impaired-driving laws appear in Appendix B. 
In the case of alcohol, the current definition of 
impaired driving has posed few problems: the 
terms "intoxicated" and "impaired" have been 
Many drivers operate vehicles after 
consuming both alcohol and one 
or more other drugs, typically 
marijuana or a prescription drug. 
defined by courts with sufficient clarity and are well 
enough known to the public that there is little con- 
fusion as to their meaning or their application. 
Moreover, quantitative standards of intoxication 
based on BAC exist in all states, and these have 
been uniformly upheld as reasonable by the 
courts. 
On the other hand, state law definitions of driv- 
ing while under the influence of other drugs are 
problematical. First of all, the language of many 
impaired driving statutes contains overly narrow 
definitions of "drug." Second, many statutes fail to 
deal with the "polydrug" case, that is, the driver 
who uses alcohol in combination with other drugs, 
or who uses a combination of drugs other than 
alcohol. 
Narrow Definitions of "Drug" 
Early state laws prohibited driving while uncler 
the influence of narcotic drugs. In 1944, the 
drafters of model legislation known as the Uniform 
Vehicle Code (16) recognized that definition was 
too restrictive, and added the language "any drug" 
to the Code provision. Many-but not all--statles 
have likewise recognized that nonnarcotic sub- 
stances can impair driving ability; accordingly, :30 
states have also revised their definitions to inclutie 
"any drug" or have adopted language that encorn- 
passes virtually all drugs. The remaining twenty 
states continue to limit their definitions to "narcotic 
drugs,'' "controlled substances," or to substanctas 
specifically listed in the law. The problem with 
such narrow definitions is that one who drives after 
consuming an uncontrolled, over-the-counter 
medication (such as a cold or allergy remedy) 
might not be in violation of the law, even though 
unable to drive safely, A related problem is posed 
by the laws of several states-including Indiana, 
Iowa, and Maryland-that exclude legal (both 
prescription and over-the-counter) drug use frorn 
their prohibitions of drug-impaired driving. These 
laws are likewise too narrow in their scope, 
because licit drugs (i.e., those that are properly 
used for medical treatment) can impair driving 
ability as well as illicit ones that are abused. 
No Provision for Combined Use of 
Substances 
Police officers and researchers have noted that 
many drivers operate vehicles after consuming 
both alcohol and one or more other drugs, typical- 
ly marijuana or a prescription drug. The interaction 
of alcohol and the other substances frequently im- 
pairs driving ability to an unacceptable degree; 
however, the problem of driving while under the 
combined influence was not specifically ad- 
dressed by state legislation until recently. In 1971 
a provision was added to the Uniform Vehicle 
Code that prohibited driving while under the com- 
bined influence of alcohol and another drug. Still, 
a majority of states, 31 in number, have yet to 
enact such a provision. In many of those states a 
prosecutor faced with a combined-influence case 
must choose whether to prosecute for driving while 
under the influence of alcohol or under the in- 
fluence of drugs, with the result that it may not be 
possible to prove either offense. 
Another, related deficiency in many states' laws 
is the lack of a provision prohibiting driving while 
under the combined influence of two or more 
drugs other than alcohol. The Uniform Vehicle 
Code was amended to contain such a provision in 
1979, but to date only four states-Delaware, 
Iowa, Maryland, and Massachusetts-have 
legislation that follows the Code's example. 
Although most state impaired-driving laws ade- 
quately define and prohibit driving while under the 
influence of alcohol, many of them contain 
deficiencies with respect to driving while under the 
influence of other drugs, or combinations of im- 
pairing substances. Model legislation contained in 
the Uniform Vehicle Code prohibits driving while 
under the influence of any impairing substance, or 
any combination of impairing substances, and that 
language forecloses the possibility that an im- 
paired driver would escape prosecution by virtue 
of an incomplete definition of "drug." 
Problems with Existing 
Every state has an implied-consent law that per- 
mits a police officer, under certain circumstances, 
to require a driver to choose between submitting to 
a lawful chemical test or risking the loss of driving 
privileges for refusal. State laws differ from one 
another with respect to a number of items, in- 
cluding: the specific offenses to which the implied- 
consent law applies (17); the types of tests that can 
be administered; drivers' rights in connection with 
the testing process; the time and place of testing; 
the number of tests that can be administered; and 
the handling of specimens. Citations to state 
implied-consent laws appear in Appendix C. 
Chemical testing, and the implied-consent 
legislation that is intended to support the testing 
process, were both developed in the context of 
alcohol-related prosecutions. Alcohol did and still 
does account for the great majority of all impaired- 
driving cases. Chemical testing for alcohol can be 
done by analyzing any of a number of body fluid 
specimens but, in the case of conscious drivers, 
breath is the preferred type of test. 
Time-Consuming Arrest and Testing 
Processes 
Nonetheless, the chemical testing process, 
even for alcohol, encounters several difficulties. 
Because impaired driving is considered a criminal 
offense, a driver must be arrested for the offense, 
which normally means being taken into custody, 
Even though a driver could be placed "under ar- 
rest" at the roadside, most police departments 
have policies requiring that those arrested for im- 
paired driving be brought to the stationhouse. In 
some states, state law requires that drivers ar- 
rested for alcohol-related offenses be kept in 
Police officers need a reliable 
method of accurately determining, 
at the roadside, whether a driver is 
in violation of the law. 
custody for some minimum period of time or meet 
certain criteria before being released from custody 
(Little and Cooper 1977). 
Frequently the testing process takes place at the 
police station or at some laboratory facility that 
could be a considerable distance from the point 
where the driver was apprehended. Thus, the en- 
tire process of apprehension, determining whether 
the driver is under the influence (observation and 
administration of field coordination tests), trans- 
porting the driver into custody, and processing the 
driver at the police station, requires up to several 
hours of an officer's time. This expenditure of time 
not only discourages officers from making 
impaired-driving arrests (for whether or not the 
suspect proves not to be intoxicated the officer 
must spend a great deal of time off the road) but 
also reduces the accuracy of any test results that 
are obtained. This is primarily so because alcohol 
concentration diminishes at the rate of about 
-015% w/v per hour, due to metabolism. 
Two possible remedies have been proposed to 
meet the difficulties associated with the proces- 
sing of impaired-driving cases: evidential road- 
side testing; and preliminary breath testing. 
An Alternative: Roadside Testing 
Police officers need a reliable method of ac- 
curately determining, at the roadside, whether a 
driver is in violation of the law, and of determining 
the driver's BAC; as close in time to the time of ar- 
rest. One solution that has been advocated is the 
use of evidential roadside testing. Use of this 
procedure would reduce the time between ap- 
prehension and testing of a driver, and would 
produce a more accurate BAC determination; it 
would also allow an officer to determine in a 
"close" case (where it is probable but not certain 
that the driver lcould be proven intoxicated and 
there is the risk that a trip to the stationhouse would 
be a waste of time) to determine whether further 
proceedings (such as an impaired-driving trial) are 
appropriate. 
Roadside Testing and the Arrest Requirement. 
There are, however, a number of legal barriers to 
roadside testing, The first of these is the require- 
ment, currently found in most states' implied-con- 
sent laws, that the driver be formally arrested for 
some alcohol-related offense before a test can be 
administered. The arrest requirement can be 
traced to the U S .  Supreme Court's decision in 
Schmerber, which appeared to treat the chemical 
test as a "search incident to" the impair~d-driving 
arrest, and therefore appeared to require a formal 
arrest as a precondition to testing. The Uniform 
Vehicle Code's il~plied-consent provision has re- 
quired, and still does require, a formal arrest 
before a test may be required, and most states 
* have provisions that parallel the Uniform Vehicle 
Code. However, it does not appear that a formal 
arrest is constitutionally required. A more recent 
Supreme Court cjecision, Cupp v. Murphy (18), 
permitted police officers to conduct a non- 
intrusive search without making a formal arrest 
beforehand, provided they had the equivalent of 
probable cause to make the formal arrest (19) and 
the evidence was likely to disappear unless the 
police acted quickly. Alcohol in a driver's body 
falls into that category of evidence, and courts in a 
number of states, relying on Cupp, have dis- 
pensed with the requirement of a formal arrest, es- 
pecially in the case of unconscious drivers given 
blood tests at hospitals (20). Thus, implied-con- 
sent legislation could be amended to eliminate any 
specific mention of "arrest" and instead permit 
tests whenever an officer has the equivalent of 
probable cause to make the arrest. This law 
change would allow police departments to develop 
policies permitting tests at the roadside. 
- - 
The proposed objective of 
prearrest testing is worthy, but 
under current constitutional law, 
the procedure that is advocated 
amounts to an illegal search and 
seizure. 
"Preliminary" Breath Testing. Some individuals 
(e.g., Hricko 1969; National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration 1980; U.S. Department of Trans- 
portation 1979) advocate that police be allowed to 
conduct so-called "preliminary breath tests" at the 
roadside, that would guide them in their decision 
whether to arrest the driver. The rationale for ttie 
prearrest test is the same as that for the proposed 
evidential roadside testing in many "close cases" 
involving alcohol impairment. The perage police 
officer has only limited ability to determine, on the 
basis of field coordination tests and observatiorls 
of the driver (such as bloodshot eyes or poor co- 
ordination), how gross that driver's intoxicatian 
may be (Dozier 1976, p. 1 ; Belardo and Zink 1976, 
p. 1). Thus, in many suspected impairment cases 
the officer chooses to take no action for fear of 
wasting time by arresting a driver who is latar 
found not to be intoxicated. The proposed pre- 
arrest test could be used whenever an officer 
suspected a driver of alcohol impairment but 
lacked the evidence required by the Constitution to 
make an arrest. Its use is also proposed in certain 
situations, such as after every traffic crash; a 
number of states' prearrest-test laws call for such 
postcrash testing (Dozier 1976). Under the 
procedure advocated by National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, an officer with a "reason- 
able suspicion" that the driver was impaired-a 
standard less than probable cause-would require 
the suspected driver to either submit to the test, or 
suffer a fine or license suspension for refusal. The 
test reading would not be used as evidence at trial, 
but only as a guide to the officer whether to make 
an arrest. Quantitative testing for alcohol would fol- 
low the arrest, and those test results would be in- 
troduced as evidence. The National Highway Traf- 
fic Safety Administration has proposed legisiation 
to accomplish this objective (21). 
Constitutional Barriers to Preliminary Testing. 
The proposed objective of prearrest testing is 
worthy, but under current constitutional law, the 
procedure that is advocated amounts to an illegal 
search and seizure that is likely to be challenged 
by a driver forced to submit to a prearrest test. 
Tests for alcohol are considered "searches" (22), 
and the U.S. Constitution requires that any search 
for evidence of crime (which is the purpose of 
these tests) requires probable cause. The extent to 
which a prearrest test would aid in law enforce- 
ment is not known, for the same impaired drivers 
who currently attract the attention of police officers 
would also be targets of efforts involving prearrest 
testing. Nor is it likely that departing from the 
probable-cause standard would significantly aid in 
law enforcement. The probable-cause standard is 
actually quite easily met; at most, all it requires is a 
belief that it is more likely than not that a driver is 
intoxicated (Dowling 1976, p. 134). 
The Future of Roadside Testing. The tech- 
nology exists to conduct roadside tests for alcohol 
concentration, and the widespread availability of 
such devices may reasonably be expected in the 
future. While many existing devices are not readily 
portable, some of them have been used at the 
At present, thirty-eight states' 
implied consent laws do not 
authorize the analysis of body fluid 
specimens for drugs other than 
alcohol. 
roadside. In the 1950s the Indiana State Police 
used the Borkenstein Breathalyzer@ for roadside 
testing. More recentry, a number of jurisdictions 
have equipped vans with breath-testing equip- 
ment. Usually these vans are staffed by qualified 
technicians and go to the location where an officer 
has apprehended a suspected impaired-driving 
offender. 
8 
In sum, then, roadside testing techniques are 
both technologically and legally possible. To use 
them, however, law changes would be necessary 
in many states; specifically, the formal arrest 
requirement that appears in the implied-consent 
laws of the great majority of states should be 
deleted and language that requires the equivalent 
of probable cause should be substituted, 
No Legal Authority to Test for Drugs 
At present, thirty-eight states', implied consent 
laws do not authorize the analysis of body fluid 
specimens for drugs other than alcohol, even if 
such an analysis could be conducted. In these 
states a police officer who desires analytic results 
Blood is the only body fluid that will 
realistically yield meaningful 
evidence regarding drug 
concentrations for living drivers. 
that could provide evidence of drug-impaired driv- 
ing has a number of more or less unsatisfactory 
options. First, the officer could attempt to obtain a 
specimen over the driver's objections, as was 
done in the case of alcohol before implied-con- 
sent statutes were enacted. However, this would 
raise serious issues of public policy and could be 
prohibited by the state's implied-consent law, 
since forcible testing is contrary to expressed 
legislative policy. Second, an officer could attempt 
to persuade the driver to voluntarily provide a Sam- 
ple; however, a driver who finds oneself suspected 
of using drugs is unlikely to agree to such a volun- 
tary test (23). Third, the officer could forego 
chemical evidence of drug concentration and rely 
solely on such qualitative evidence as driving er- 
rors, impairment of physical capabilities, and in- 
ability to pass field sobriety tests, Such evidence is 
considered by prosecutors to be weaker evidence 
in drug-impaired driving cases than test results, 
even though other evidence of impairment is at 
their disposal. Thus, in those cases where drug 
analyses could be of value in proving guilt, the 
absence of an implied-consent provision for drug 
analysis could unnecessarily handicap law 
enforcement. 
Not All Tests Reveal Drug Use 
Various body fluids can be drawn and analyzed 
to determine alcohol concentrations. Blood, urine, 
saliva, and breath can all yield accurate measure- 
ments of the drrver's BAC. Because the breath test 
is relatively sirrrple and inexpensive, nonmedical 
personnel can conduct breath tests, and drivers 
consider it the least intrusive of the chemical tests, 
the breath test is preferred by police agencies. 
When the cor~centration of drugs other than 
alcohol is of interest, however, specimens of 
breath cannot be analyzed for drug concentra- 
tions. Blood is the only body fluid that' will 
realistically yield meaningful evidence regarding 
drug c~ncentra~tions for living drivers (Joscelyn 
and Doneison '1 980, pp. 50-5 1). 
Currently, it IS possible to analyze blood 
specimens and to determine for most drugs 
whether they are present and in what quantities 
they are present. Unlike alcohol, though, blood 
drug concentrations have not yet been established 
as presumptive levels of impairment. As a result, 
analyses of blood for drug concentrations require 
expert testimony in court that can interpret analytic 
findings to provide legal evidence of impairment. 
Sometimes this is possible, such as when the con- 
centration of a particular drug is far above that 
which is considered "theraputic," or when it in- 
dicates that an overdose had occurred, Frequent- 
ly, however, the evidence gained from chemical 
analyses will be less conclusive. In addition, unlike 
alcohol testing, analytic techniques for other drugs 
are costly or not widely available and thus might be 
considered unjustifiably expensive and time-con- 
suming for use in prosecuting the relatively minor 
offense of impaired driving. In sum, chemical tests 
for drugs are available, but they presently have 
only limited value as evidence in drug-impaired 
driving trials. 
Even assuming that the implied-consent law 
authorizes the analysis of specimens for drugs 
other than alcohol, blood specimens cannot be 
drawn from drivers under the implied-consent laws 
of some states. Testing procedures set out in a 
state's implied-consent law are determined in part 
by considerations of efficiency in the enforcement 
process, the coiivenience of the apprehended 
driver, general fairness, and reliability of test 
results. One manifestation of these policies is the 
existence of provisions that limit officers to requir- 
ing breath tests, except for deceased and uncon- 
scious drivers. Implied-consent laws in fourteen 
states permit police to obtain only breath 
specimens from conscious drivers. Breath 
specimens cannot be analyzed for the preserlce 
and concentrations of substances other than 
alcohol. 
In many of the thirty-six states that authorize 
tests other than the breath test, legislation allows a 
driver to choose from among available tests. 
Typically these provisions either allow a driver to 
decline a blood test and take less intrusive tests- 
namely, a breath test, a urine test, or both (24)--or 
allow the driver to choose from among the 
available tests. Eight states give drivers the right to 
refuse a blood test, and six offer the driver a choice 
of tests. In addition, Michigan's law permits the 
driver to demand a breath test only. In all of these 
fifteen states, then, a driver can select a test other 
than the blood test and effectively defeat any ef- 
forts to have performed an analysis for drugs other 
than alcohol. 
In six other states, the implied-consent law is 
ambiguous or even silent on this question. This 
leaves only fifteen states in which the police officer 
has an absolute right to specify what test will be 
given. The implied-consent laws of those fifteen 
states contain language that parallels that of the 
Uniform Vehicle Code: the officer has the express 
authority to select the test to be given. That provi- 
sion, in theory, permits an officer to demand that 
the driver submit to the blood test. However, blood 
analyses are especially time-consuming since 
trained medical personnel are required to with- 
draw specimens and laboratory technicians are 
needed to perform the analysis. As a result of 
these considerations, many police departments 
prefer to administer the breath test unless ci~r- 
cumstances require another form of testing-- 
typically, when they encounter an unconscious 
driver who cannot provide the necessary breath 
specimen. Some police departments have 
recognized the value of a blood analysis in 
suspected drug-impairment cases and have 
reported using the blood test in those circum- 
stances. 
Some Laws Permit Only One Test 
Another feature of state implied-consent legisla- 
tion that could adversely affect testing for drug:; 
other than alcohol is language that refers to a "test" 
rather than "test or tests" as it appears in the 
Uniform Vehicle Code. Thirty states use the former 
language in those states. It is therefore possible 
that courts in those states could interpret the law 
literally and limit the officer to a single test. Such an 
interpretation could greatly restrict the testing 
process for substances other than alcohol. Con- 
sider, for exampie, the hypothetical situation of a 
driver, apprehended for impaired driving, who has 
consumed both alcohol and another substance, 
such as marijuana. The officer, who notices the 
odor of alcohol, administers the breath test and 
discovers that the driver's BAC is well below . lo% 
w/v; however, the driver appears grossly impaired, 
which raises the inference that impairing sub- 
stances other than alcohol are also involved. 
Another test-that of the driver's blood-would be 
negligence, chemical test results have value in a 
civil case as well as in an impaired-driving 
prosecution. In addition, road authorities of states 
and their political subdivisions have faced an in- 
creasing number of suits filed by injured drivers al- 
leging road defects. Evidence of the injured 
driver's impairment may provide the road authority 
a defense against the driver's suit, namely that the 
driver's impairment also contributed to the injuries. 
The Uniform Vehicle Code permits the introduc- 
tion of test results in "any civil or criminal action or 
proceeding" arising out of impaired driving (25); 
however, some states-for example, Michigan- 
have laws that allow introduction of results only in 
trials of traffic-related offenses in which impair- 
ment is an element. 
States that have adopted the 
Uniform Vehicle Code's provisions 
SUMMARY: DEFICIENCIES 
have the most useful statutory IN EXISTING LAWS 
tools for dealing with the impaired- 
driving problem. All states have two types of laws directed at 
those who drive while under the influence of 
alcohol or other drugs. The first of these are 
required to determine whether the driver had taken 
other drugs. However, if the courts of that state 
should hold that only one test is permitted, then 
that test already has been administered and no 
further analyses are possible, unless the driver 
voluntarily agrees to them. Quantitative evidence 
relating to drug impairment probably could not be 
obtained in this case. Police departments in at 
least two states-New Mexico and South Dakota- 
that have single-test provisions in their laws have 
reported this to be a problem; the problem could 
be even more widespread. 
Some Laws Unnecessarily Restrict 
the Introduction of Test Results 
In many instances an impaired driver is involved 
in and responsible for a traffic crash, often one in- 
volving a fatal or serious injury. Whether or not the 
driver is arrested and prosecuted for a traffic crime 
or offense, the crash usually causes the victim to 
start a civil action in which the victim sues the im- 
paired driver and possibly others (such as the 
owner of the vehicle). Since the civil action is 
based on an allegation that the other driver was 
negligent, and since impairment by alcohol or 
other drugs is evidence tending to prove 
impaired-driving laws, that define the offense of 
driving while under the influence, and set out 
punishments for those found guilty of the offense. 
The second are implied-consent laws, that 
govern the time, place, and manner of otherwise 
lawful chemical testing to determine the con- 
centration of alcohol or other drugs in the driver's 
body. These laws are intended to achieve the 
same goal-to deter persons who are unable to 
operate a vehicle safely from driving. There are no 
nationwide laws dealing with impaired driving. A 
model set of statutes dealing with alcohol, drugs, 
and driving, does exist. These model statutes are 
contained in what is known as the Uniform Vehicle 
Code (National Committee on Uniform Traffic 
Laws and Ordinances 1979). They comprise the 
most complete set of impaired-driving and 
implied-consent provisions that have so far been 
developed. States that have adopted the Uniform 
Vehicle Code's provisions have the most useful 
statutory tools for dealing with the impaired-driving 
problem. Most state statutes, though, lack one or 
more of the provisions contained in the Uniform 
Vehicle Code. As a result, they are likely to have 
some weaknesses with respect to enforcing their 
laws. The following are chief among the deficien- 
cies of state laws: 
Laws that do not define the term "drug" in 
their impaired-driving provision as "any 
drug" (for example, limiting it to "narcotic 
drugs" or "controlled substances") fail to 
include all substances that can impair driv- 
ing ability. 
Laws that clo not prohibit driving while un- 
der the combined influence of alcohol and 
other impairing substances, or a com- 
bination of impairing substances other than 
alcohol, fail to include the so-called "poly- 
drug" user who cannot operate a vehicle 
safely. 
Laws that exempt users of licit (i.e., pre- 
scription or over-the-counter) drugs fail to 
include a class of impaired drivers who 
pose as serious a highway safety hazard as 
those who drive while under the influence 
of alcohol or illicit drugs. 
Laws that fail to authorize chemical tests of 
blood for conscious drivers prevent police 
officers fronn drawing specimens that can 
be analyzed for drug concentrations. Like- 
wise, implied-consent laws that do not per- 
mit the ansilysis of specimens for drugs 
other than alcohol prevent police officers 
from having specimens analyzed for drug 
concentrations. 
Laws that give drivers the option of taking 
other chemical tests in lieu of the blood test, 
or that allow a driver to choose from among 
available tests, limit the ability of police of- 
ficers to draw specimens that can be 
analyzed for drugs. 
Laws that lirnit police officers to taking a 
single test of the driver's body fluids create 
situations in which a police officer initially 
determines that a driver is grossly impaired 
and that sub:stances other than alcohol are 
involved, but is prevented from investiga- 
ting further. 
One other difficulty is presented by implied- 
consent statutes, including the most recent 
Uniform Vehicle Code provisions. The require- 
ment of a formal arrest, which most states still re- 
tain, is a barrier to roadside testing of offenders. It 
appears that formal arrests are not required by the 
Constitution, so long as probable cause to arrest 
exists. The chief deficiencies of each state's cur- 
rent legislation are summarized in tabular form in 
Appendix D. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The preceding analysis has shown that state 
impaired-driving and implied-consent statutes are 
generally effective in dealing with persons who 
drive while under the influence of alcohol. Still, 
with respect to the alcohol offender, these laws are 
not totally effective. The chief deficiency of present 
laws is their retention of the formal arrest require- 
----- 
Ail of the deficiencies identified in 
this paper can be remedied by 
statutory change by state 
legislatures. 
ment, which unnecessarily precludes police of- 
ficers from conducting evidential tests for BAC at 
the roadside-a procedure that would yield more 
accurate results and save police officers' time. 
With respect to drugs other than alcohol, 
impaired-driving and implied-consent statutes 
both exhrbit deficiencies that hinder police officers 
in detecting and prosecutors in prosecuting those 
who are accused of driving while under the in- 
fluence of drugs. Laws in many states contain in- 
complete definitions of drugs that do not account 
for the full range of impairing substances. These 
laws frequently fail to account for the combined 
use of impairing substances by drivers, especially 
alcohol in combination wiih marijuana or prescrip- 
tion drugs. Thus, some persons who are unfit to 
operate motor veh~cles could, in these states, es- 
cape prosecution despite having posed a risk ic) 
highway safety. 
In the great majority of states, implied-consent 
legislation still applies to alcohol-related offenses 
only. In those states the prosecution lacks 
authority to have a body fluid specimen analyzed 
for drug concentrations. Moreover, many states 
preclude police officers from obtaining the type of 
specimens that could be analyzed for drugs, 
because they either authorize breath tests only, or 
allow drivers to avoid blood tests. In those cases, a 
police officer would be prevented from obtaining a 
specimen that could be analyzed for drugs-even 
if state law allowed such analysis to be done. Pro- 
visions limiting the police officer to demanding one 
test only from the driver could also inhibit the 
gathering of evidence of drug impairment es- 
pecially when that driver had consumed both . 
alcohol and other impairing substances. 
All of the deficiencies identified in this paper can 
be remedied by statutory change by state 
legislatures, since none of these deficient provi- 
sions are dictated by constitutional requirements. 
Not all of the countermeasures that have been 
proposed by safety advocates are legally feasible, 
however; specifically, the proposed remedy of 
prearrest (preliminary) breath testing in the 
absence of probable cause would be likely to 
be ruled unconstitutional. 
We therefore recommend that states consider 
adopting the model statute that appears in Appen- 
dix A to this paper. The provisions of this statute 
are, for the most part, based on the 1979 revision 
of the Uniform Vehicle Code's impaired-driving 
and implied-consent laws. We have deleted the 
Uniform Vehicle Code's requirement of a formal 
arrest from those provisions and made other, 
minor changes in the language. In sum, our prin- 
cipal recommendations are: 
Eliminate restrictive and underinclusive 
definitions of "drug" in impaired-driving 
laws and instead prohibit driving while un- 
der the influence of any drug. Provisions 
that exempt users of licit drugs from the 
impaired-driving law should also be 
eliminated. 
* Broaden impaired-driving laws to prohibit 
driving while under the influence of any 
combination of impairing substances: 
alcohol plus another drug; alcohol plus a 
combination of other drugs; and com- 
binations of drugs other than alcohol. 
Eliminate provisions in implied-consent 
laws that allow a driver to choose the test to 
be administered, or to demand other tests 
in lieu of the blood test. Add language 
specifically granting the police officer the 
authority to choose the test to be ad- 
ministered. 
laws to drug-related as well as alcohol- 
related offenses, and add specif ic 
language authorizing the analysis of body 
fluid specimens for drug as well as alcohol 
concentrations. 
Add language to implied-consent laws that 
specifically authorizes the administration of 
multiple tests. 
Delete from implied-consent laws the 
requirement that a driver be formally ar- 
rested before testing can take place, and 
substitute language authorizing testing 
whenever the officer has the equivalent of 
probable cause to arrest. Avoid including a 
prearrest-test provision in the implied-con- 
sent statute, for such a provision is highly 
unlikely to survive a constitutional chal- 
lenge. 
Model legislation based on the 1979 Uniform Vehi- 
cle Code (with minor modifications to eliminate the 
requirement of a formal arrest) is presented in Ap- 
pendix A. We consider that model statute to be il- 
lustrative of what provisions an individual state's 
impaired-driving and implied-consent statute 
should contain. Because of subtleties in their 
legislative drafting processes, states may find it 
necessary to make minor departures from the 
language offered in the model statute, 
Extend the coverage of implied-consent 
A Checklist for Reviewing Legislation 
Does Your State's Impaired- Any impaired driving poses a threat to highway safety; thus, a 
Driving Law Prohibit Driving state law that defines the offense of impaired driving should ac- 
While Under the Influence of All count for all substances that can impair the ability to drive safely, 
Impairing Substances? Specifically, the definition of impaired driving should include 
impairment caused by (a) alcohol; (b) any other drug or com- 
bination of drugs; or (c) alcohol plus one or more other drugs, In 
addition, the fact that a drug is being used legally (by prescription 
or purchased over the counter) should not be a defense to an 
impaired-driving charge. The term "drug" should refer to all irn- 
pairing substances. 
Does Your Staite's Implied- Most states' implied-consent laws allow for the chemical analysis 
Consent Laws Allow the Analysis of body fluids for alcohol content only. In those states, it is likelly 
of Body Fluids For Drugs Other that a court would refuse to admit analytic results, obtained from 
Than Alcohol? specimens gathered under the implied-consent law, as evidence 
in an impaired-driving trial. Evidence obtained under an implied- 
consent law-or by any other lawful search, or with the driver's 
consent-should be admissible in any civil, criminal, or ad- 
ministrative action arising out of or associated with the incident 
that led to the request for test results, and in which alcohol or drug 
impairment is an issue. 
Does Your State's Implied- Most implied-consent laws either do not authorize blood tests or 
Consent Statute Allow Police allow a driver to choose a chemical test other than blood. Thus, 
Officers to Demand Blood even in states where analytic results pertaining to drugs could be 
Specimens Frorn Drivers Under admitted at an impaired-driving trial, a driver could defeat a drug 
Penalty of License Suspension? analysis in the first place. An implied-consent law should allolii~ 
tests of blood, breath, urine, or other body fluids and should ex- 
pressly give a police officer the power to name the test that is 
given. 
Does Your State's Implied- Most implied-consent laws, as well as the Uniform Vehicle Code, 
Consent Statute Allow Testing require that a driver be "under arrest" before tests may be re- 
When probable Cause Exists for quired. Police officers equate the term "arrest" with the formal 
an Impaired-Driving Arrest? process of taking the suspect into custody, booking, and release 
on bail. Recent federal and state court decisions have determined 
that those formalities of arrest are not constitutionally required, 
provided there is probable cause to make an impaired-driving 
arrest. 
Many states' impaired-driving and implied-consent laws contain one or more of the deficiencies that 
were discussed in this paper. A state-by-state summary of these deficiencies appears in Appendix D. 
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APPENDIX A 
Proposed Model Legislation 
Note: The model legislation that we propose differs 
slightly from that which was prepared by the National 
' 
Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, 
and which appears in the 1979 Supplement to the 
Uniform Vehicle Code and Model Traffic Ordinance. 
Language added to the Uniform Vehicle Code by the 
authors of this article appears in bold type; language 
deleted from the Uniform Vehicle Code is interlined with 
dashes. 
Sec. 6-205.1 -Revocation of license for refusal to 
submit to chemical tests 
(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon 
the highways of this State shall be deemed to have 
given consent, subject to the provisions of Sec. 11- 
902.1, to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breath, or 
urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic or 
drug concentration of his blood or breath 44ewM-k 
in connection with* any offense arising out of acts al- 
leged to have been committed while the person was 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or any other drug. 
The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of 
a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to 
believe** the person to have been driving or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle upon the highways 
of this State while under the influence of alcohol or any 
other drug. The law enforcement agency by which 
such officer is employed shall designate which of the 
aforesaid tests shall be administered. 
(b) Any person who is dead, unconscious or who is 
otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of 
refusal, shall be deemed not to have withdrawn the con- 
sent provided by paragraph (a) of this section and the 
test or tests may be administered, subject to the provi- 
sions of Sec. 11-902.1. 
(c) A person requested to submit to a test as provided 
above shall be warned by the law enforcement officer 
requesting the test that a refusal to submit to the test will 
result in revocation of his license to operate a motor 
vehicle for six months. Following this warning, if a 
person w&+w& refuses upon the request of a law 
enforcement officer to submit to a test designated by the 
law enforcement agency as provided in paragraph (a) 
of this section, none shail be given, but the department 
of motor vehicles, upon the receipt of a sworn report of 
the law enforcement officer that he had reasonable 
grounds to believe thewe&&person had been driving 
alcohol or any other drug and that the person had 
refused to submit to the test upon the request of the law 
enforcement officer, shall revoke his license subject to 
review as hereinafter provided. 
Sec. 11-902-Driving while under influence of 
alcohol or other drugs 
(a) A person shall not drive or be in actual physical 
control of any vehicle while: 
1. The alcohol concentration in his blood or 
breath is 0.10 percent or more based on the 
definition of blood and breath units in Sec. 11- 
902.1 (a)@); 
2. Under the influence of alcohol;t 
3. Under the influence of any other drug or com- 
bination of other drugs to a degree which 
renders him incapable of safely driving; or 
4. Under the combined influence of alcohol and 
any other drug or drugs to a degree which 
renders him incapable of safely driving. 
(b) The fact that any person charged with violating 
this section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol 
or any other drug shall not constitute a defense against 
any charge of violating this section. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided in Sec. 11-902.2, 
every person convicted of violating this section shall be 
punished by imprisonment for not less than 10 days nor 
more than one year, or by a fine of not less than $100 
nor more than $1,000, or by both such fine and 
imprisonment and, on a second or subsequent con- 
viction, he shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
less than 90 days nor more than one year, and, in the 
discretion of the court, a fine of not more than $1,000. 
Sec. 1 1-902.1 -Chemical and other tests 
(a) Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or 
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been 
committed by any person while driving or in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol or other drugs, evidence of the concentration of 
alcohol or other drug in a person's blood or breath at 
the time alleged, as determined by analysis of the 
person's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily sub- 
stance, shall be admissible. Where such a chemical test 
is made the following provisions shall apply: 
or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon 1. Chemical analyses of the person's blood, urine, 
the highways of this state while under the influence of breath, or other bodily substance to be con- 
sidered valid under the provisions of this sec- 
tion shall h~ave been performed according to 
methods approved by the State department of 
health and by an individual possessing a valid 
permit issued by the State department of health 
for this purpose. The State department of health 
is authorized to approve satisfactory tech- 
niques or methods, to ascertain the qualifica- 
tions and competence of individuals to conduct 
such analy~~es, and to issue permits which shall 
be subject to termination or revocation at the 
discretion of the State department of health. 
2. When a person shall submit to a blood test at 
the request of a law enforcement officer under 
the provisio~~s of Sec. 6-205.1, only a physician 
or a registered nurse or other qualified person 
may withdraw blood for the purpose of deter- 
mining the alcoholic or drug content therein. 
This limitation shall not apply to the taking of 
breath or urine specimens. 
3. The person tested may have a physician, or a 
qualified technician, chemist, registered nurse, 
or other qualified person of his own choosing 
administer a chemical test or tests in addition to 
any administered at the direction of a law en- 
forcement officer. The failure or inability to ob- 
tain an additional test by a person shall not 
preclude the admission of evidence relating to 
the test or tests taken at the direction of a law 
enforcement officer. 
4. Upon the request of the person who shall sub- 
mit to a chemical test or tests at the request of a 
law enforcement officer, full information con- 
cerning the test or tests shall be made avail- 
able to him or his attorney. 
5. Alcohol concentration shall mean either grams 
of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams 
of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(b) Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or 
proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been 
committed by any person while driving or in actual 
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, the concentration of alcohol in the person's 
blood or breath at the time alleged as shown by analysis 
of the person's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily sub- 
stance shall give rise to the following presumptions: 
1. If  there was at that time an alcohol con- 
centration of 0.05 or less, it shall be presumed 
that the person was not under the influence of 
alcohol. 
such fact shall not give rise to any presumptiori 
that the person was or was not under the in-. 
fluence of alcohol, but such fact may be con- 
sidered with other competent evidence in 
determining whether the person was under the 
influence of alcohol. 
3. If there was at that time an alcohol concentra-, 
tion of 0.10 or more, it shall be presumed that: 
the person was under the influence of 
alcohol.tt 
4. The foregoing provisions of this subsection 
shall not be construed as limiting the introduc- 
tion of any other competent evidence bearing 
upon the question whether the person was un- 
der the influence of alcohol. 
(c) OPTIONAL. If a person +R&GW& refused to 
submit to a chemical test under the provisions of Sec. 6- 
205.1, evidence of refusal shall be admissible in any 
civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts 
alleged to have been committed while the person was 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or other drugs. 
The requirement of a formal arrest is eliminated by eliminating the 
phrase "arrested" or "under arrest." The equlvalent of probable 
cause to arrest is still required. 
" The phrases "probable cause to believe" and "reasonable 
grounds to believe," both ~ndicate that the equlvalent of probatrle 
cause to arrest is requ~red. 
t This provision is necessary to cover the cases where no chernicial 
test results are available for prosecution because of the driver's 
refusal to submit, failure of testing equipment, or suppression of 
test evidence by the court. 
tt Subsection (b)(3) need not be enacted in any state adopting g: 11- 
902(a)(l) which makes driving with a blood alcohol concentration 
of 0.10 or above an offense, irrespective of actual impairment of 
driving. 
2, I f  there was at that time an alcohol con- 
centration in excess of 0.05 but less than 0.10, 
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